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The crises of the national banking period
happened during predictable liquidity
crunches that occurred in the fall and
spring. The U.S economy in the mid-
1800s was based primarily on agricul-
ture, and the needs of the agricultural
sector dominated the demands placed on
the banking system. Each spring, farm-
ers required cash and loans to buy equip-
ment and supplies for the planting sea-
son. In the fall, demand for liquidity also
was high as farmers moved crops to
market. Due to the long-distance nature
of these transactions and the limited
communication of the period, cash was
typically demanded in payment. 
But cash at these times was hard to come
by. The National Banking Act had been
passed to provide an “elastic currency,”
one that expanded with the seasonal
demand for liquidity and contracted
when the demand subsided. The act
allowed national banks to issue bank-
notes backed 100 percent by eligible
U.S. government bonds. Congress hoped
that national banks would issue notes as
necessary to supply the elasticity
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The terrorist attacks of 9/11 trig-
gered a staggering increase in
demand for U.S. dollars all over the
world, a demand which threatened 
to disrupt the American payments
system but was met swiftly and 
successfully by the Federal Reserve.
Earlier in the nation’s history, the
system didn’t respond so well to
severe shocks. This Commentary
describes financial crises that
occurred during one period in which
the country had no central bank.
W hen the Twin Towers of the World
Trade Center collapsed as a result of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
much of the financial infrastructure of
Lower Manhattan was badly damaged.
Communications and computer systems
were destroyed or heavily impaired. Sites
important to the payments operations of
numerous banks had to be evacuated. Air
transportation, a key player in the pay-
ments system because it delivers checks,
was grounded. 
These disruptions kept some banks from
sending payments, and, at the other end
of the payments chain, greatly increased
the demand for liquidity at those finan-
cial institutions that were not able to
receive payments. Despite all of these
problems, there was no sense of any-
thing that looked like a financial panic
or banking crisis. No bank runs
occurred. Individuals had no problems
cashing checks or withdrawing money
from banks.
It wasn’t always like this. In the past,
our nation’s financial system did not
fare so well during periods of unusually
high liquidity demand. Before the Fed-
eral Reserve System was established,
financial crises had far-reaching and
longer-lasting effects. To understand
how bad the economic repercussions of
liquidity crunches used to be, this Com-
mentary examines the banking crises
that occurred during one of the times
when the United States had no central
bank—an era referred to as the national
banking period (1863–1913). Although
the Fed is not the only institutional dif-
ference between now and then, looking
at these earlier crises might help us
appreciate how the Fed was able to avert
a financial crisis on 9/11, when the heart 
of the nation’s financial infrastructure
was attacked. 
■ An Anatomy of Banking
Crises
“The month of August will long remain
memorable as one of the most remark-
able in our industrial history. Never
before has there been such a sudden 
and striking cessation of industrial activ-
ity…. The complete unsettlement of 
confidence and the derangement of our
financial machinery, which made it
almost impossible to obtain loans or 
sell domestic exchange and which put
money to a premium over checks, had
the effect of stopping the wheels of
industry…” 
— Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 
September 17, 1893, reporting on the
effects of the crisis of 1893
When bank customers attempt, en
masse, to convert their deposits into cash
at a large number of banks more or less
simultaneously, economists call it a
banking crisis. During the national bank-
ing period, the most severe banking
crises occurred roughly every 10 years,
in 1873, 1884, 1893, and 1907. Once a
banking crisis got going, several things
typically happened. First, bank reserves
were depleted rapidly. Banks refused to
make payments in cash, partially or
completely. Firms had difficulty making
their payrolls, and long-distance trade
was interrupted. Local substitutes for
cash sprang up, such as scrip. (Scrip was
a local medium of exchange, typically
redeemable in goods or services pro-
vided by the issuer.) Interest rates went
through the roof, and currency premia
were charged (more than a dollar’s worth
of deposits traded for a dollar’s worth 
of currency). required by the seasonal fluctuations in
liquidity demand. However, in this
sense, the system failed. There was little
variation in aggregate bank-note
issuance across the seasons. 
Compounding the problem was the way
banks’cash reserves were stored. Dur-
ing periods of low money demand, too
many reserves wound up concentrated
in just one city because of “pyramiding
of reserves.” Banks in the interior of the
country were allowed by law to hold a
fraction of their reserves in banks
located in cities designated as “reserve
cities.” Reserve city banks then could
ship their excess funds to banks in cities
designated as “central reserve cities.”
Ultimately, a significant percentage of
reserves accumulated in New York City,
where in 1907 only six banks held 75
percent of interbank deposits. When
currency demand was high in the inte-
rior because of spring planting or crop
moving in the fall, interior banks with-
drew their interbank deposits. The
resulting contraction of reserves forced
New York banks to call in loans, leading
to high interest rates in money markets. 
At these seasonally recurring times of
great currency demand, the banking sys-
tem was under much stress, and any
additional shock easily led the public to
perceive instability in the system. The
undermining of confidence periodically
resulted in bank runs. Some banks
needed infusions of reserves at these
times, which they didn’t get. But the
evidence suggests that the banking sys-
tem held sufficient reserves at the begin-
ning of each of the period’s crises. The
problem was that reserves were not in
the right place at the right time. Elec-
tronic transfers of funds between banks,
of course, did not exist. Reserves
needed to be physically transferred by
the relatively slow transportation system
of the period. The practice of holding
reserves in a faraway bank made it diffi-
cult to obtain adequate reserves in a
bank at the time of a run. The system
provided no efficient means of redistrib-
uting reserves to the locations where
they were most needed. 
■ The Crisis of 1907
For an example of an additional pres-
sure that the banking system might have
to withstand, we can look to the crisis of
1907. The extra pressure began, in this
case, with several trust companies,
which had grown substantially from
1890 to the early 1900s. They held large
volumes of deposits in commercial
banks in New York City. Beginning in
October 1907, during the fall crop-
moving period, a number of the largest
trusts experienced runs by depositors.
The Knickerbocker Trust Company, the
third-largest trust company in New York,
was the first to experience problems on
account of concerns about the quality of
its balance sheet. This was followed by a
run on the second-largest trust company. 
New York banks were confronted not
only with the normal seasonal with-
drawals but also with withdrawals from
the trust companies. Country banks,
aware of difficulties obtaining currency
during previous crises, reacted strongly
in 1907 by quickly pulling funds from
New York City banks. New York City
banks began to restrict cash payments
made to depositors. 
Quickly, trepidation spread to other parts
of the country. After New York City banks
restricted payments, countrywide restric-
tions soon followed, with some states offi-
cially sanctioning the restrictions.  
Restrictions on cash payments—which
remained in effect until January 1908—
took various forms, from limiting with-
drawals to a certain amount to the total
suspension of payments. While suspend-
ing payments preserved precious liquid-
ity and bought banks time to acquire
reserves or liquidate assets so they could
eventually meet depositor withdrawals,
the suspensions had consequences that
spilled over into the economy as a whole. 
One consequence was the difficulty firms
faced in securing cash to make payrolls.
Some firms had to lay off workers or
cease operations for a period of time.
Sometimes alternative forms of payment,
such as company-issued scrip, partially
overcame these difficulties. However,
these alternative forms circulated only
locally and did not facilitate long-
distance transactions, which typically
required cash. Railroads, for example,
required cash to transport farmers’crops
to market.
A short, but very severe, contraction
accompanied the crisis, with real output
falling around 11 percent from 1907 to
1908. According to economists Milton
Friedman and Anna Schwartz in their
Monetary History of the United States,
the contraction, which began in May
1907, became more severe with the onset
of the banking crisis in October. They
claim that “there can be little doubt that
the banking panic served to intensify
and deepen the contraction.”
Besides the collapse of the trust compa-
nies, two other factors helped to cause
the 1907 crisis. One was a delay in
implementing a mechanism that usually
worked to provide some relief to banks
in times of a liquidity crunch, the clear-
inghouse loan certificate. The certifi-
cates were issued by members of the
New York Clearinghouse Association to
settle interbank balances. Basically, they
were a form of interbank loan between
members of the clearinghouse. The cer-
tificates helped banks maintain liquidity
by substituting for cash in settling bal-
ances at the clearinghouse. Clearing-
house loan certificates had the effect of
making the reserves of all clearinghouse
banks available to any threatened bank.
However, during the crisis of 1907,
clearinghouse loan certificates were
issued too late to help many banks. 
A renowned economic historian,
O.M.W. Sprague, claims that the man-
agement committee of the clearinghouse
delayed issuing the certificates because
the members thought—erroneously,
according to Sprague—that issuing
them would cause banks to suspend
payments. They believed this because in
earlier panics certificate issuance had
preceded payments suspension. Sprague
asserts that if the clearinghouse had not
delayed issuing its certificates, the 1907
crisis could have been averted.
Another contributing factor to the 1907
panic was speculative activity. During
previous crises, currency had sold at a
premium relative to deposits. In 1907,
depositors, anticipating a recurrence of
this phenomenon, withdrew their cur-
rency for speculative reasons. And, in
fact, during the 1907 crisis, the currency
premium ran as high as 4 percent. 
■ Cries for Reform
After the crisis of 1907, Congress
formed the National Monetary Commis-
sion and directed it to study possible
reforms to the banking system. The
commission’s report criticized the
national banking system and recom-
mended its major overhaul as well as
the creation of a central bank. Their 
suggestions ultimately resulted in the
passage of the Federal Reserve Act,
which was signed into law by President
Woodrow Wilson in December 1913. To compensate for the weaknesses of
the national banking system, the Fed-
eral Reserve System was designed
specifically to provide a currency that
would expand and contract as neces-
sary—“a more elastic currency,” in the
words of the Federal Reserve Act. The
means by which the Federal Reserve
was to provide the extra currency was
by serving as a lender of last resort. The
idea was that when commercial banks
had exhausted all other possibilities,
they could turn to the Federal Reserve
for additional liquidity. The Federal
Reserve would loan reserves to the
banks, who would use their commercial
paper (promissory notes of firms) as
collateral. A commercial bank could
come to the Fed’s discount window
with commercial paper, and the Fed
would grant a loan to the bank by dis-
counting the commercial paper. The
loan would take the form of Federal
Reserve notes (or equivalently, deposits
at the Fed). 
These loans were intended to provide a
reliable source of reserves to the bank-
ing system. Although the operation of
the discount window has changed sig-
nificantly from this original conception,
its purpose remains much the same
today—an ultimate source of liquidity
for the banking system. Subsequent 
legislation extended Fed powers to
include open market operations, another
means of providing reserves and liquid-
ity to the banking system.
The extreme volatility in bank reserves
seen during the national banking period
diminished significantly after the found-
ing of the Fed. Furthermore, as is evident
in figure 1, the strong seasonality of
interest rates observed during the
national banking era diminished
markedly with the Fed’s founding. By
providing a readily available source of
reserves during periods of high liquidity
demand, the Fed smoothed interest rates.
■ The Fed’s Response after
9/11
When people think of how the Federal
Reserve helps to keep the economy and
the financial system working well, keep-
ing inflation under wraps is likely to
spring to mind before “providing liquid-
ity.” But the specter of the post-attack
economic havoc that 9/11 could have
caused—but didn’t—can teach us how
important the provision of liquidity can
be in a time of crisis. 
The initial impact of the terrorist attacks
on the financial system is reminiscent of
the beginnings of crises during the late
1800s and early 1900s. On September 11
and the following days, the system
encountered a significant shock to the
demand for liquidity. The disruptions 
in communications and transportation
associated with the attacks conjure 
up the limited communications and
transportation capabilities of the national
banking era. However, one major differ-
ence is that during this modern crisis, an
ultimate provider of liquidity to the
financial system existed. 
The Federal Reserve System reacted
quickly to the events of September 11,
releasing the following statement at 
10 a.m.: “The Federal Reserve System
is open and operating. The discount
window is available to meet liquidity
needs.” 
The provision of liquidity in the days
following September 11 was unprece-
dented in Federal Reserve history. On
September 12, discount window 
borrowing by financial institutions
peaked at over $45 billion, relative to
around $100 million on a typical day.
On the same day, the Trading Desk of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
injected $38 billion in liquidity through
open market operations, compared to a
typical daily action of $3.5 billion. The
Federal Reserve also extended swap
lines with the European Central Bank,
the Bank of England, and the Bank of
Canada in an attempt to provide liquid-
ity to international markets. In an
intermeeting action on September 17,
the Federal Open Market Committee
lowered the federal funds rate 50 basis
points to 3 percent. Its press release
emphasized the Fed’s intent to “con-
tinue to supply unusually large volumes
of liquidity to financial markets” and
that as a result, “the actual federal
funds rate may be below its target on
occasion.” In fact, the effective rate
remained below the target rate for six
days, reaching a low of 1.19 percent on
September 19. 
This strong reaction by the Federal
Reserve is deeply rooted in our
nation’s history. The crises of the late
1800s and early 1900s taught our
nation important lessons about the con-
sequences of a banking system ham-
pered in its ability to provide liquidity
when it is most needed. 
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